


3 March 1980

NOTE FOR: NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/SP
NIO/NESA
NIO/GPF

SUBJECT: DCI Worldwide Briefing Before SASC on 6 March

1. Consultations between OLC and SASC Staff have yielded no particular questions that they have of the DCI (at this time). However, there have been several Defense Department hearings before this Committee in the past six weeks.

2. Attached are four separate agenda papers, each of which is related to a DoD briefing of the SASC. They are provided for your information and possible use in preparing your backup material for the subject hearing. A copy of these agenda papers will be provided to the DCI this evening for his information. Should he have any particular questions on any of the material contained therein, I will advise you soonest.



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Attachments

cc: Ch, NIC

SPEED LETTER		REPLY REQUESTED		DATE
		YES	NO	29 February 1980
TO : <input type="checkbox"/>		FROM:		LETTER NO.
ATTN: VIA: <input type="checkbox"/>		Office of Legislative Counsel		OLC 80-0558
FYI: SUBJECT: DCI's March 6 Appearance Before the Senate Armed Services Committee				
<p>In discussing the appearance of the DCI before SASC with SASC staff, I was told there will be no prepared agenda when the DCI briefs the Committee. The DCI's appearance is viewed as an opportunity for the DCI to provide his own views and not to follow any prepared agenda. In fact, there appears to be little preparation on the staff's part for the briefing. One staffer did provide me with the attached four agenda from past hearings (all since January) and suggested it might provide a guide for those preparing the DCI. He took care to point out the <u>Major Issues</u> section of the papers. In addition, the staffer noted that when addressing the "Threats to oil sources", the DCI would be prudent to discuss the regional internal problems. He used the Baluchi problem as an example.</p> <p>The SASC staff also noted that staff attendance at the DCI's Worldwide briefing will be extremely limited with probably <u>only four</u> staff, at the maximum, being allowed entry.</p>				
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		SIGNATURE		
REPLY		DATE		

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AGENDA-MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND INDIAN OCEAN HEARING
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Status Report

- Overview of military and political situation in Iran.
 - Hostage crisis
 - control over militants at U.S. Embassy
 - physical and mental well-being of hostages
 - risks of harm to hostages
 - impact of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on hostage crisis
 - real objectives of Ayatollah Khomeini and of the militants
 - potential impact of January 25 election of President in Iran
 - External threats to Iran
 - Iraq
 - Soviet Union
 - mission of Soviet forces on Iran-Afghanistan border
 - status of Iranian military forces
 - Iran's political prospects
 - intensity and durability of popular and military support for Ayatollah Khomeini
 - role and strength of Communist parties in Iran
 - prospects for increased regional conflict in Iran
 - viable challengers to Khomeini's leadership
 - impact of economic and bureaucratic problems on popular support for Khomeini's government
- Overview of military and political situation in Afghanistan.
 - Soviet military actions and objectives
 - size and capabilities of Soviet forces in Afghanistan
 - review of Soviet invasion and Karmal coup
 - expected future Soviet military actions including probability of cross border raids into Pakistan
 - Soviet casualties to date
 - prospects for the Karmal government
 - status of Afghan military
 - consolidation of power
 - popular support
 - strength and capabilities of Muslim rebels
 - sources and magnitude of outside support
 - Afghan military desertions to rebels
 - analysis of Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan

- U.S. and world preoccupation on hostage crisis in Iran
- impact on Sino-American relations, especially military
- impact on Soviet allies and friends in Muslim world (Syria, Iraq, Libya and PLO)
- impact on Iran
- impact on Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistani relations
- impact on growing anti-American trend in Muslim world
- impact on separatist movements in Iran and Pakistan
- impact on Indo-Soviet relations
- reaction by international community, especially by Non-Aligned Movement
- impact on Soviet-American relations especially regarding SALT II
- role of new generation of Soviet leadership in the decision

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